Section 224: The National Defense Authorization Act FY 2027
Summary: Section 224 of the Chairman’s Mark of the NDAA establishes a new U.S. Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative aimed at accelerating joint research, development, and integration of Israeli origin and jointly developed defense technologies into U.S. military systems and programs of record. It directs the Secretary of Defense to designate an executive formalize deeper cooperation and integration across emerging and existing domains, including counter-drone systems, missile and air defense, quantum computing, AI and autonomous systems, cyber and electronic warfare, directed energy, and defense industrial base co-production, while facilitating pathways from R&D into procurement. This section requires regular reporting to Congress on progress and technology transitions, and emphasizes rapid adoption of Israeli defense innovations to strengthen U.S. military capabilities and technological supremacy.
As political pressure builds to reduce U.S. military assistance to Israel, Section 224 provides the framework for continuing - and expanding - U.S.-Israel military ties by entrenching Israeli technology within the U.S. defense supply chain in a way that would shield it from the annual appropriations process. The use of must-pass legislation as the NDAA as a mechanism of integration speaks to the plummeting popularity of continuing unconditional support to Israel.
The original text of this section is derived from were H.R.7540 and S. 3855 (The U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act (Jackson, R-TX/Budd, R-NC) which direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to formalize deeper cooperation and integration.
Section-by-Section Analysis
(a) ESTABLISHMENT—The Secretary of Defense shall designate an executive agent, responsible for synchronizing cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel, to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation.
This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to designate an Executive Agent (EA) to expand and accelerate deeper integration of Israel into U.S. institutions. The EA would be solely focused on implementing Section 224. EA authority takes precedence over the authority of the other DoD Component heads per DOD Instruction 5101.01, meaning that the EA would be able to overrule determinations by other DOD agencies such as the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) on Israeli access to U.S. technology.
The appointment of an EA would replace direct Congressional oversight with supervision by the Secretary of Defense. There would be no Congressional confirmation or ability for removal of an executive agent by Congress.
(a) (1) Identifying jointly developed or Israeli-origin technologies with operational utility for potential integration into United States systems and programs of record;
Section (a)(1) seeks to integrate American and Israeli research and development programs by encouraging the direct use of Israeli-manufactured technology into the US’ systems, including its military programs. This would render the United States dependent on Israel’s provision of such technologies, thus giving Israel a significant amount of leverage over future American policy and infrastructure. This would go beyond the typical bilateral relationship by significantly enhancing Israeli leverage through control of critical U.S. military supply chains, and may also inherently give preference to Israeli technologies over U.S.-origin competitors..
(a)(2) Ensuring collaborative research initiatives involving government, private sector, and academic institutions in the United States and Israel, is done in a manner that protects sensitive technology and information and the national security interests of the United States and Israel;
This provision would further entangle the defense supply chains of Israel and the United States across government, private and academic sectors, which blurs the lines of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The provision assumes that U.S. and Israeli national security policies and objectives are inseparable, despite very clear current evidence (the Iran conflict, for instance) that they can be divergent.
(a)(3) Facilitating the transition of technologies from research and development into procurement and acquisition pathways;
Subsection (a)(3) directs the accelerated transition of military technologies out of early-stage research, testing, and experimentation and into the formal Department of Defense pathways for funding, buying, and fielding at scale. By targeting procurement and acquisition specifically, the provision is designed to move cooperative efforts beyond research dialogue and toward the actual adoption of technologies into U.S. systems and programs of record. Once such transitions occur, it will be very difficult for future Administrations to uproot such technologies or agreements from major defense procurement programs - and indeed would make DOD Program Executive Offices and Program Managers advocates for the continued inclusion of Israeli-origin technologies in U.S. systems.
(a)(4) Establishing frameworks for joint ventures, licensing agreements, and United States-based co-production or manufacturing partnerships with Israeli industry;
Israeli defense manufactures are often direct competitors to U.S. industry. Establishing licensing and co-production agreements to have Israeli companies manufacture in the United States would enhance Israel’s competitiveness in the U.S. market by sidestepping Buy-America provisions. Furthermore, licensing agreements could give Israeli companies access to intellectual property for weapons systems they are directly competing against.
(a)(5) Coordinating with relevant Department of Defense components, including the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate, capability development and innovation divisions, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Defense Innovation Unit, the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working Group, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, the United States Space Command, the military departments, and other Department of Defense entities, as appropriate, to align efforts and avoid duplication;
Section (a)(5) circumvents the established structures and hierarchy of the Department of Defense by granting the EA the ability to harness the powers and resources of the DoD writ large. It would give that individual the authority to re-allocate the funding and focus of the Department at will, effectively prioritizing the integration of Israel into the US’ national defense structures - and doing so in some of the most sensitive areas of defense technology and operations, giving Israel immense insight into emerging U.S. defense capabilities and operational requirements. This re-allotment of resources could also lead to delays in other fronts, including crucial research and development, given that personnel and funding would be removed from other critical projects in order to focus on this uncalled for integration.
(a)(6) Promoting joint training exercises and information-sharing mechanisms to enhance operational readiness to deploy jointly developed technologies;
Section (a)(6) deepens Israeli integration into the United States’ military infrastructure, as well as intelligence-gathering networks that have directly contributed to civilian deaths in Iran, Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. Incorporating Israel into not just the production of military technology, but also into its usage and implementation, diminishes the American military’s ability to act independently by sharing trade secrets crucial to the US’ defensive and offensive capabilities with a foreign power. Additionally, involving other countries in the development of military tactics decreases the US’ own qualitative military superiority and legitimacy.
Section (b) COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.—The synchronized cooperative efforts under subsection (a) may be carried out through the following domains:
(1) Counter-Unmanned Systems including aerial, maritime, and ground platforms.
(2) Anti-tunneling and subterranean threats.
(3) Missile and air defense technologies.
(4) Artificial intelligence, quantum, machine learning, and autonomous systems.
(5) Directed energy and advanced sensing.
(6) Cyber defense, electronic warfare, and digital resilience.
(7) Biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and medical defense.
(8) Network integration, data fusion, and contested logistics.
(9) Defense industrial base cooperation, manufacturing, and co-production.
(10) Other emerging technologies as jointly agreed by the United States and Israel.
Section (b) extends cooperative efforts with Israel to our most sensitive areas of military research, technology, and production. Among the most concerning of the potential extensions of collaboration is artificial intelligence, quantum and biotechnology.
AI and quantum are/will be tremendously impactful on current and future US military capabilities. Due to the sensitivity of these technologies, US advanced AI, quantum (which has applications beyond computing), and next generation cyber technologies are tightly restricted, even among close allies. Currently, access to U.S. research on such technologies is strictly limited to the UK and Australia under AUKUS Pillar II, a core partnership in countering the People’s Republic of China influence in the Pacific. This legislation would extend access to cutting-edge military AI research to Israel without including counterintelligence or human rights safeguards.
Deepening defense co-operation with Israel, particularly in the field of emerging defense technologies, creates and expands risks to the U.S. military edge. This program would expose future areas of U.S. military advantage to a country that is known to maintain a robust technological espionage program and which has previously exported sensitive U.S. military technologies to adversaries including the People’s Republic of China — the very nation that the only existing US partnerships on AI/quantum military technologies work to counter. Furthermore, Israel is a leading exporter of offensive cyber tools that have been used to target U.S. citizens, including U.S. Government officials.
Additionally, many of Israel’s military technologies have been field-tested in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israeli AI enabled targeting systems, surveillance platforms, and predictive tools have been used in operations that human rights organizations and U.N. experts have linked to war crimes and genocide. Israel uses AI-powered tools to generate lists of buildings to be attacked, assign ratings to residents of Gaza to determine if they are military targets, and determine when a resident is in a particular location. Human Rights Watch has found that these tools rely on systemic surveillance of Palestinians in Gaza that is incompatible with international human rights law. United States integration with AI systems developed and used for these purposes would put us at risk for human rights violations and further erode international trust.
Section (b) also extends collaboration with Israel in the area of biotechnology. The biotechnology field poses both incredible promise and incredible dangers to humanity. The convergence of AI and genomics enables the design of novel or enhanced pathogens that can serve as bioweapons. Because of this, all countries with whom the U.S. has existing Congressionally authorized programs have ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty that prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Israel, however, is one of only 10 countries around the world that has neither signed nor ratified the BWC.
This program, if authorized, would be the U.S.’ first with a country that has refused to foreswear offensive biological weapons, and is widely suspected to have an active offensive biological weapons program. States Parties to the BWC (such as the United States) are required to ensure that any biomedical collaboration with an entity that is not party to the BWC (such as Israel) does not in any way contribute to biological weapons programs, but this program does not include any such safeguards. This gives this legislation the incredibly dangerous potential to implicate the US in the production of bioweapons.
(c) ACTIVITIES IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate activities, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to ensure consistency with existing laws and regulations.
directs the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with State, Commerce, and other agencies to keep the cooperation consistent with existing law, a routine interagency-alignment clause (notably implicating export-control and trade equities through Commerce).
Sections (d) INTERIM PROGRESS UPDATEand Section (e) REPORT.
The interim briefing (180 days) and the annual report (running through 2030) require DoD to keep the congressional defense committees apprised of who is running the program (the designated executive agent), the state of coordination with Israeli counterparts, which technologies are being prioritized, and what is actually being transitioned into U.S. acquisition programs or fielded systems. The emphasis on "transition, prototyping, or integration" and on "partnerships established with United States and Israeli industry" signals that this is not a study or dialogue but an operational effort to move Israeli technology into U.S. systems and to link the two countries' defense industrial bases.
Sections (f) FORM and Section (g) DISCLOSURES:
Reports are unclassified with a classified annex, and DoD must post periodic public updates "to the maximum extent practicable," explicitly framed around how the effort advances "United States technological and military supremacy," while carving out anything that would compromise operational security, export controls, or sensitive technology.
A New Policy’s Recommendation: STRONGLY OPPOSE
A New Policy strongly opposes section 224 because the purpose of this section is to avoid the scrutiny and transparency afforded through the current grant assistance to Israel in favor of a mechanism designed to implant Israel’s defense and intelligence establishments into the most sensitive and basic levels of America’s own defense technology ecosystem. This approach exposes sensitive U.S. capabilities to counterintelligence risk, normalizes technologies developed in contexts of occupation and civilian harm, disadvantages U.S. defense companies ability to compete with Israeli competitors, deepens U.S. legal and reputational exposure without clear strategic necessity, and aims to hide continuing U.S. military support to Israel from Congressional and public transparency.
A New Policy recommends Amendment of the underlying bill to strike this section. Were this section to carry into the version of this bill offered for final passage, A New Policy would recommend voting against the underlying bill.
